The Ukrainian military is baffled. They expected a larger and much fiercer resistance to their surprise invasion of the Kursk region of Russia. And despite Kremlin-controlled press claims of successful resistance, there is little evidence of it so far. But why?
Is this a sign of Russian military incompetence, which is visible in the war in Ukraine? Are Putin's army commanders using the time to build up the necessary forces to avoid diverting too many troops from the front lines in Donetsk? Will what Putin considers a sufficient response be something big—perhaps a massive missile and drone strike against Kyiv, or even the use of tactical nuclear weapons to deter and punish? Or maybe it's just that the man hired to take over the defence of Kursk, Alexei Dyumin, is getting time to come up with a plan?
Either way, the question is: What will Putin do?
Dumin, for his part, is not to be underestimated. Dubbed "Putin's bodyguard" by the Western media, he was indeed the Russian leader's bodyguard in 1999 before being promoted to deputy head of the Federal Security Service. The 52-year-old was born in Kursk, knows the region well and is deeply attached to the Russian military, as his father headed the fourth department of the main military medical directorate of the Ministry of Defense.
Dyumin studied at a military school and studied engineering, rising to deputy head of the Special Forces of the Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU) during the annexation of Crimea. He is said to have orchestrated the escape to Russia of Ukraine's former pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych, who served as chief of staff of the Russian ground forces and deputy defence minister before becoming the hardline governor of Tula in 2016.
Some see Dyumin, who moved to the Kremlin earlier this year, as Putin's possible future successor. He is seen as capable, steadfast and cold - not unlike his boss. It is known to be methodical - a possible explanation for the delay in the Russian counteroffensive.
Another possible explanation, however, is that Putin has once again demonstrated how he can remain paralyzed during a crisis, even disappearing from the public eye. It's a characteristic that has previously drawn comparisons with Joseph Stalin, who retreated to his villa and remained isolated as German troops pounded the Soviet Union in 1941.
The parallel was first drawn by Moscow critics of Putin during the Covid-19 pandemic. Hiding in his Novo Ogarevo estate on the outskirts of Moscow, Putin has been absent from the capital as it struggles to contain the spread of the deadly virus. Mark Galeotti, an analyst at Britain's Royal Joint Services Institute, noted his trait of letting "certain serious threats become someone else's problem."
This may explain a pattern that emerged when man-made or natural disasters occurred during Putin's rule. In 2000, he was vacationing at his Sochi mansion when the Kursk nuclear submarine sank in the Barents Sea. He subsequently met with the relatives of the 118 victims as a media firestorm erupted over his absence - and the meeting did not go well. In 2018, it was criticized for its slow response to a massive mall fire in the Siberian city of Kemerovo that killed at least 64 people, 41 of whom were children. After the disaster, he was accused by grieving families of repeating the same mistake.
Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky and commanders are now waiting for a full response from Russia - it is interesting why it is taking so long. But when it comes to the Ukrainians' next moves, they also have questions to ponder. Should they stay and dig in to defend the wedge in Russia? Should they withdraw completely, or only partially and create a buffer zone?
If Ukraine believes it can get Putin to divert significant manpower and equipment from the strategically more important Donetsk region, where Russia is now 15 km from the city of Pokrovsk, Kyiv may simply be tempted to hold its ground and try to widen the scope of the offensive. Retired General Mark Kimmitt, a former US assistant secretary of state for political and military affairs, fears the consequences if Ukraine chooses to do so.
"My biggest fear is that if any of the Russian generals have read the books or studied any of the battles of their predecessors in World War I, they will try to wall off the invading troops either by 'trapping' them inside Russia or by deeper envelopment of the territory of Ukraine. If this happens and they are able to fight and complete the encirclement, then the Russians will "concentrate their forces" as they did against the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad. It's not going to be pretty,” Kimmitt said.
Trying to hold the wedge would likely mean sending additional troops to the 12,000 believed to be inside Russia, and Ukraine is short on manpower. Ukraine's electronic warfare and air defense capabilities are already strained. Russia can take advantage of this by starting to bomb the entrenched troops. From here came another request of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He again called on Western allies to allow the Ukrainian military to use the long-range missiles much deeper into Russian territory.
Amid all this uncertainty, Zelensky said on August 18 that Ukrainian forces aimed to maintain a buffer zone – although it was unclear whether it would encompass the entire wedge or a much smaller area. But the last thing Zelensky wants is to face a serious pushback in Kursk or see victory turn into defeat for pride, undermining the morale boost the invasion finally gave Ukraine and its allies. | BGNES
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Analysis by Jamie Detmer for Politico
