Why should Russia lose the war against Ukraine? The short and unequivocal answer to the question thus posed is: Because it is in our (Bulgaria - editor's note) strategic interest.
Reframed in a positive aspect, the question is why should Ukraine win this war, which the Russian Federation, in complete violation of international law, formally started on 02/24/2022? Hence the question of why it is in our strategic interest for Ukraine to win.
First of all, Russia has to lose because it is the aggressor. The Kremlin bears all the blame for this full-scale and unprovoked military aggression. For starting this war against a sovereign Ukraine and for all the casualties and destruction caused, and most of all for the war crimes committed by Russian forces in Ukraine, Moscow must lose. The Russian Federation trampled on international law and as a result, the politics of force and war returned to Europe. The continent's existing security architecture was destroyed by Moscow's aggression.
The strategic security environment as a result of Russian aggression has already been fundamentally changed, and regional destabilization has a particularly negative impact on our security as well. A full-scale war is already being fought in the Black Sea region, which is close to our borders, and the danger that one day it will transfer to other countries in Europe cannot be ruled out.
In this context, let us not forget the Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008, the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the subsequent bloody destabilization of Donbas. The Kremlin is responsible for all this.
Second, if left to win in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin will not stop his aggression there. The Kremlin is pursuing a revanchist strategy to restore the influence of the former USSR in Europe, which it is implementing by all possible means, including the use of military force. Let's not forget that Vladimir Putin views the collapse of the USSR as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century." If we allow Russia to win in Ukraine, the risk of new Russian aggression towards other countries in Europe, including NATO member countries, increases dangerously. In such an extremely negative scenario, apart from the expected new victims, destruction and war crimes against the people of Ukraine, Putin will also lay hands on the resources of this country, which he will use for his further war against the "collective West".
In such a development, in addition to Moldova and Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which in the past were forcibly included in the composition of the USSR, may also be affected. An attack on a NATO member country means the activation of the collective defence clause, or Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Then Russia will go to war with the entire Alliance, with all possible adverse security implications for the entire Euro-Atlantic area. This certainly affects Bulgaria as a NATO ally.
If it succeeds in conquering Ukraine, the leading target of further Russian revanchist policy will be South-Eastern Europe. Currently, Russia is trying with the tools of hybrid warfare to stop Euro-Atlantic integration in the Western Balkans and to establish its sphere of influence in the region. It seeks to achieve this through destabilization by creating new and exploiting and exacerbating existing contradictions between states. The Kremlin continues to capitalize on its growing influence in Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, attempting to extend the reach of the Belgrade-Banja Luka axis of Russian influence to the northern parts of Kosovo, Montenegro and the Republic of North Macedonia. And also to Slovakia, ruled by Robert Fico, and to Viktor Orbán's Hungary.
The agenda of the pro-Russian political factors in the countries of the Western Balkans is to follow the goals set by Russia and sabotage the integration of the EU and NATO. A possible victory for Russia in Ukraine will give Moscow new forces and resources to continue its strategic offensive towards the Balkans. In this context, we must remember that the Kremlin views Bulgaria as "the Russian door to the Balkans", without the opening it will be difficult to reach Serbia and Greece (Reshetnikov). Therefore the wider regional axis of Russian influence in Eastern Europe is being built by upgrading the current Belgrade-Banya Luka.
Thirdly, Russia must also be defeated because of its long-standing systemic hybrid war, which it is waging against NATO, the EU and Bulgaria as well. And not only. Russia has long waged a hybrid war against Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and all the countries in the post-Soviet space that it wants to bend to its will. For us, Russia's hybrid actions against Bulgaria should be the best and most convincing argument for why Moscow should lose the war in Ukraine. And from there comes the answer to the question of why we should help Ukraine achieve this victory, and therefore why it is in our strategic interest. Stepping on this objective understanding of the looming danger, we also understand why we must continue sending military aid to Ukraine, for which the National Assembly has already taken the relevant nationally responsible decisions.
As for the Russian hybrid war against Bulgaria, we should consider the whole picture, in its complex and comprehensive analysis. Currently, to realize its strategic interests, Russia relies, in addition to inherited and systematically built, maintained, strengthened and expanded networks of influence from its political, economic, media, academic, ecclesiastical, public (with high priority mastering since the dawn of democracy of models and forms of public organizations imported from the West) and other agencies by country, as well as a peculiar own hybrid international of high-ranking politicians and leaders in Europe, especially in the Central and South-Eastern parts of the continent. If Russia defeats Ukraine, then this European hybrid international of hers will have even greater leeway and potential opportunities to expand its membership.
Russian subversive activity against our country is aimed at creating long-term destructive processes in Bulgarian society, which in the future will support the Kremlin's strategy of mastering from within the process of making sovereign national decisions, and hence of the state government.
If Moscow is defeated, the hybrid international will receive a severe blow, and the trend will be reversed in the direction of its gradual shrinking and neutralization, which also lead to a decrease in its opportunities for the realization of strategically deviant behaviour affecting the sovereign decision-making of state-strategic level of management. Therefore, at present, each member of the hybrid international, in his actions, allowed by law and following the position of power, seeks to prevent the possibility of Russia losing the war against Ukraine. Therefore, the number one task for these strategically dangerous proxies is to sabotage the process of sending military aid to Ukraine, while in their public appearances, they repeat Russian strongholds and systematically promote the Russian narrative. The most blatant Russian hybrid lie, around which other pieces of the Russian disinformation puzzle are assembled, not only in our country but also in other European countries, is precisely the one about war-peace, resp. Warmongers-peacemakers.
In this context, we must be realistic and remain constantly vigilant. Even if the war is lost, which will logically trigger disintegration processes in it, the Russian state will not stop with its attempts to exert influence in our region. Even if weakened and disintegrating, even if its constituent parts are at war with each other, Russia will not stop looking to Europe and the Balkans. Therefore, until the character of the Samara Russian state is fundamentally changed, until this state is transformed into a democratic and normal legal state, the hybrid threat to us will remain alive and significant. This requires building and strengthening our national resilience against hybrid impacts and ever-closer integration within NATO and the EU.
Given all of the above, a victory for Ukraine and a defeated Russia, and probably a future Russia in a phase of creeping disintegration and further loss of relative weight in international relations, for us means first of all security. This is because, in such a case, Russia would be placed in a virtual impossibility of again starting an aggressive war against any country in Europe. The intention and sense of revenge and desire for revenge may, in principle, be preserved in the kleptocratic authoritarian elite and in the worldview of the new president appointed by the Kremlin superintendent, but there will be a lack of a suitable military instrument to be used for the forceful realization of the revanchist Russian world power strategy.
In this regard, losing the war will almost certainly lead to Putin being replaced by a new president who will be similar to him, but who will be forced to seek peace due to resource constraints to continue the war. However, another development is also possible. Not that the loss of the war leads to the removal of the failed Kremlin leader, but that the removal of Vladimir Putin leads to a denouement - a cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Russian troops from all occupied territories, and subsequently a peace, with the elite willing to blame the loss fell squarely on Putin and his inner circle. In this case, today's Russian state will remain authoritarian, imperial in philosophy and reflexes and revanchist. The Russian Federation will be weakened, and the country may even begin to gradually disintegrate, but the elite (without Putin and his inner circle as scapegoats) will have primarily ensured their survival and retained control over the resources of the country, and hence its well-being. This cannot help but predetermine their relatively accommodating behaviour towards the West to maintain access to their assets in Europe and the US, with the hope of future business opportunities. This, in turn, would make it easier to make peace with Ukraine on Ukrainian terms.
That is why a Russian Federation that has lost the war and is weakened, even entering a slow process of disintegration, means security for Ukraine. And for Moldova, and Georgia, and the other former Soviet republics as well. This will bring peace and security to the Black Sea, and hence to all of Europe. In this case, the supremacy of international law will be restored, and this is the way to rebuild the destroyed security architecture in Europe after the start of the war. This means a more predictable, stable and secure strategic environment for Bulgaria. | BGNES
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Analysis by Mikhail Naydenov, National Security Expert
