George Friedman: Russia, Ukraine and Other Extreme Thoughts

 

In one of my last articles I wrote that the war in Ukraine is over, but no one knows how to end it. What I meant was that the general outlines of the military aspects of the war were locked and the conflict contained. The war was started by the Russians who wanted to take control of Ukraine to create a buffer zone to prevent the United States and Ukraine from threatening Russia. The United States intervened by sending weapons to Ukraine to block a Russian advance that could threaten NATO and Western Europe. The Ukrainians wanted to prevent the Russians from taking any territory from their homeland.

The war was part of a series of defensive moves by Russia, the United States and Ukraine, each more offensive and dangerous than the last. The Russian push failed to break the Ukrainians and the Americans. Their defensive capabilities combined with their fear of defeat blunted the Russian advance. The fear of the Russians prevented them from abandoning their constant efforts to breach the enemy's defense mechanisms.

In my opinion, the Russians do not break their enemies. At the same time, the Ukrainians will not be able to break the Russians, in part because the improbability of success will limit any attack and because the United States, having succeeded in blocking threats to its interests, is not willing enough to sustain the fight. This seems to force the final outcome for all parties, but the issue is more complicated.

Any settlement that did not result from the total defeat of one side would have to deal with the root cause of the war, namely Russia's fear of future attack. Russia would have to be coaxed into agreement both by realizing the improbability of military success and by somewhat reducing its sense of vulnerability by annexing a significant part of Ukraine, but by no means all of it. The problem for Ukraine is that such an agreement can only serve as an interlude until Russia rebuilds its forces and resumes the offensive. Ukraine cannot be sure of US military support at a later stage and will therefore face a difficult defense situation.

In a war that ends without one side being completely defeated, the fear is that any agreement will simply be a prelude to another conflict and defeat along the way. The Russian view is that any land concession would be insufficient. Ukrainians fear that ceding land would make Russia much more dangerous, and Americans would fear an endless war that would create internal resistance and vulnerability to other threats.

Analyzes of what appears to be hopeless must consider Russia's non-military needs. The Soviet Union was impoverished and its military posture was not as strong as many thought. His fall left Russia in a similar position. There was no radical solution. Russia has had to correct this situation at a time when its military weakness is even clearer.

I have tried to show that the war is over - in the sense that no one is able to achieve their goal - but that at the same time achieving a sustainable peace agreement is extremely difficult. If the United States followed the model of World War II, where instead of demanding capitulation, which is impossible for Moscow, it focused on a relationship based on rebuilding rather than destroying Russia, it could withdraw from a finished war. In this situation, the Russians could pursue their economic interest: developing an economy that would place them at the forefront of nations.

Russia has valuable natural resources such as a workforce that needs training and industrial plants that need rebuilding. This will not be a government project that could not be encouraged, but an investment opportunity. The US government did not create Toyota or Daimler-Benz. The strategy humanizes barbarian enemies.

I am by no means a pacifist, nor do I indulge in heartbreaking fantasies. What I am doing is confronting the fact that the United States is engaged in a war that will defy common sense because of the legitimate fears of all parties. And I go back to the lessons of World War II and the ways in which the US treated its defeated enemies. Russia is not defeated and has the strength to continue the war even if it does not win. It is not in America's interest, but turning Russia from an uncertain enemy into an investment opportunity would be in America's interest. And, of course, American troops will remain in Europe for the time being, if necessary.

There is nothing idealistic about that. That's just the way American wars usually end. Therefore, it was conceived as a decision in the national interest. It is uncertain whether it will be followed or whether anyone will agree, but the question is: how many years is a stalemate war worth? /BGNES

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George Friedman, "Geopolitical Futures"