If former President Donald Trump wins the US presidential election in November, it will have significant implications for US foreign policy, including in Washington's priority area - the Indo-Pacific region. Of course, there is still much uncertainty about exactly how a second Trump administration might handle the region, largely due to the whims of Trump himself.
One possibility is that Trump's new team will simply dust off its old 2019 Indo-Pacific strategy, which largely coincides with the Biden administration's, and continue to compete against China and strengthen alliances and partnerships. But the other possibility is that the US under Trump 2.0 turns its back on the Indo-Pacific to focus on an “America First” agenda, potentially emboldening adversaries and endangering key allies and partners.
The evidence so far suggests that while Trump's second term is likely to continue to prioritize great-power competition, he may simultaneously step up his "transactional" — or, more benignly, realistic — approach to allies and partners. Indo-Pacific region. For example, Trump's choice of J.D. Vance as vice president, an ardent supporter of competition with China, suggests that strategic competition will be a defining feature of Trump's strategy. But Trump's comments last month, in which he said Taiwan "should pay for our defence," fueled the idea that the Republicans will continue to view allies and partners solely through the lens of how they can help the United States.
Those concerns are strongest in Eastern Europe, where Trump has similarly questioned US support for Ukraine in its ongoing war with Russia.
For the most part, Indo-Pacific countries have remained tight-lipped about Trump's potential return to the White House. This is mostly due to respect for sitting presidents and a general reluctance to comment on US domestic politics because it opens the door for Washington to do the same to them on their domestic issues. But that doesn't mean the Indo-Pacific isn't considering the very real prospect of a second Trump term; it certainly does. Responses from across the region to a second Trump term are likely to be mixed, with the determining factor being whether the country in question maintains close relations with the United States. Typically, those who do will be most concerned, but others less dependent on Washington, including rivals, will be either indifferent or welcoming.
The Indo-Pacific's receptivity to Trump's second term will be important to analysts as it will contribute to the success or failure of US efforts in the region. Although officials from the first Trump administration like to tout their achievements, in reality, the region has been on the brink during those four years and craved more predictable and stable US policy. The Biden administration was certainly not perfect, but at least it offered these things and in doing so greatly strengthened America's position in the region. A second Trump administration could match or surpass the efforts of the Biden team if it succeeds in allaying concerns about abandoning or undermining American politics.
Northeast Asia would be a good start. Very disturbingly, Trump's most ardent supporter there is North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. During his first term, Trump met with Kim three times and even became the first sitting US president to cross the demilitarized zone in North Korea, in a risky gamble to convince Kim to proceed with denuclearization. Trump's diplomatic efforts are certainly to be commended, but throughout 2018 and 2019, Kim secretly continued to build his nuclear arsenal.
Trump has since played down that point and has persistently portrayed the relationship as positive, recently remarking of Kim: "I get along with him, I think he misses me," a claim that North Korean state media recently denied. Nevertheless, Kim would like to see Trump back in power to resume diplomacy, with the ultimate goal of easing sanctions and preserving his nuclear weapons. Trump offers that opportunity.
But America's two long-time security allies in Northeast Asia, South Korea and Japan, are concerned that Trump could please Kim at their expense. South Korea is persistently trying to deter a North Korean attack or invasion and is pursuing denuclearization. Yet during his first administration, Trump referred to US-South Korean military exercises as "war games," echoing North Korea's provocative descriptions of the alliance's deterrent activities. He also sought a 400 per cent increase in 2020 in Seoul's spending on maintaining US troops stationed in South Korea. If Trump becomes president again, South Korea will seek to maintain the progress it has made in healing the alliance and focus on North Korea as the main threat.
An emboldened North Korea could also influence Japan, which has repeatedly endured Pyongyang firing ballistic missiles into its maritime territory. However, that did not stop Trump at one point from publicly pondering whether the US-Japan alliance should be renegotiated to ensure Japanese support should the US ever be attacked. That could open the door to changes in other parts of their mutual defence treaty that could affect Japanese security. In June, however, Trump's interlocutors happily signalled to both Japanese and South Korean officials that he would keep the annual Biden-era trilateral summit to help maintain those alliances.
Japan is further concerned by China's growing assertiveness throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Much of its attention has been focused on the long-standing standoff over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, but in recent years Tokyo has turned its attention further south to the Taiwan Strait. Following Trump's comment on whether it was worth defending Taiwan from a Chinese attack, a Japanese government spokesman pointedly noted that "peace and stability" in the Taiwan Strait were "extremely important not only to our security but also to the entire international community ". Taiwan also has concerns about a second Trump administration. The latter's comment on the island essentially confirms for Taipei its reluctance to expend American resources and personnel on an overseas conflict unless it directly affects US national security. In response, the Taiwanese premier stressed that "Taiwan is constantly strengthening its defence budget and adjusting the conscription period to strengthen the resilience of our society and demonstrate its responsibility as one of the members of the international community." After all, Taiwan wants to avoid falling into the same category as Ukraine in Trump's eyes.
Finally, within Northeast Asia, China's response to the second Trump administration will be quite interesting. Beijing seems to have mixed views. On the one hand, as Trump may intensify competition between the great powers, this may pose new challenges to China. On the other hand, if he backs away from US alliances and partnerships both bilaterally and multilaterally (as he did in 2017 when he pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement), then this could support Beijing's goals. such as “unification” with Taiwan or establishing control over the South China Sea. At least for now, Beijing's position on Trump is a mystery, but Chinese leaders are likely to welcome him if he rethinks US alliances and partnerships.
In Southeast Asia, many countries remain neutral on the prospect of a "Trump 2.0" scenario. Last month, for example, Singapore's defence minister noted in an interview with Foreign Policy that "we've worked with the Trump administration before... I'm not that worried." During my trip in May to Indonesia, one of the world's largest democracies, almost no one raised concerns about a second Trump administration. The same goes for Brunei and East Timor. Vietnam - a key strategic partner of the United States that continues to have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea and along the Mekong River - stands to lose a lot if a future Trump administration cuts its support. Yet Hanoi remains silent. However, his silence should not be interpreted as consent, and the level of receptivity will largely depend on Washington's support for achieving the country's goals. There are other countries in Southeast Asia, including Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, that could welcome Trump's approach. These authoritarian states despise American lectures on human rights and the need for democracy, and the new Trump administration may eschew these kinds of engagements to cooperate more closely with them in the area of great powers competition.
Perhaps the biggest loser in Southeast Asia from a second Trump administration will be the Philippines. In recent years, Manila has broadened and deepened its security alliance with Washington to help counter Beijing's intensifying tactics in the South China Sea's grey zone, particularly in the disputed Second Thomas, Scarborough, Sabina and Titu Island shoals. Disturbingly, Trump, during his first administration, seemed uninterested in the US-Philippines alliance. When, for example, then-President Rodrigo Duterte tried to cancel the Visiting Forces Agreement — a key part of the alliance — Trump responded: “I don't mind if they want to do it. It will save a lot of money... my views are different from others.
But the current president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., is Duterte's opposite — pro-American and anti-Chinese — and therefore seeks sustained commitments from Washington. Without US support, the Philippines will be left mostly to fend for itself against growing Chinese encroachments in its exclusive economic zone. Separately, Malaysia is likely to oppose Trump, mostly based on his support for Israel in its war against Hamas. Officials in the Muslim-majority state strongly support both the Palestinians and Hamas, so they will oppose Trump if his pro-Israel policies remain unchanged.
In the largest country in the region and the largest democracy in the world - India, Trump's return will be welcomed. Although Trump has criticized India in the past over US job losses, his relationship with Prime Minister Narendra Modi is strong and New Delhi generally appreciates Trump's cooperative approach. Trump's first team also successfully included India in its Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China, most notably by reviving the Quad, a multilateral security group that includes Australia and Japan. Washington supported New Delhi with intelligence during the May and June 2020 land border clashes against China and was ready to look elsewhere in its long-standing defence relationship with Moscow. Smaller and medium-sized countries in South Asia, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, likely view Trump neither as a threat nor as a positive contributor to their interests. But as with much of Southeast Asia, that will depend entirely on the actions he and his administration take in the region. Of the six countries, Afghanistan is likely to feel the least threatened, given that Trump is the same president who negotiated the deal to pull the US military out of that country. Bangladesh, which experienced a student coup earlier this month, will first have to put its own house in order before it can think about foreign policy and how to rebuild.
Finally, Trump's return to the White House would be highly unsettling for most, if not all, countries in Oceania. Despite being a US security ally, during Trump's first term, Australia began to consider the need for greater self-reliance because it felt it could not fully trust Washington. And now the stakes are even higher, especially because of the need to maintain the AUKUS security pact signed under Biden to counter China. In recent years, New Zealand has moved from an independent and neutral foreign policy to one that now prioritizes a closer security partnership with the US. But Wellington may deviate from that approach if Trump returns, not least because of the consequences for its Pacific Island allies, which could prompt it to reconsider joining the non-nuclear arm of AUKUS, known as Pillar 2.
Going forward, the incoming Trump administration will have to assess its attitude toward the countries of the Indo-Pacific region and make appropriate adjustments in its policies and strategies. | BGNES
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Derek Grossman, "The Diplomat"
